Sandoz confirms that Sandoz assumes responsibility for defending the entire remedy if the marketing activities under this agreement should be contested with possible disputes. [19] Southernport added, « The principles of Coal Cliff Collieries are consistent with our law. The first and third situations to which Kirby P refers are covered by Letaba Sawmills (a.a.) and Firechem (a.a.O.) respectively. The agreement at Southernport fell into the first category. This agreement, such as Booker,[18] deals with incompleteness. So it falls into the third. [19] [45] I agree that these principles are German, but I would limit their application to agreements relating to works of art that were in the field of SSDs. The main terms of the contract had indeed been agreed and I consider that the contract relied on and relied on by Hiline was concluded until 30 November 2004, as the Court of Justice found. It remains to be seen whether Van Jaarsveld and Van der Spuy were entitled to conclude a contract for Hiline. « First of all, the rule of integration (or parol proof) remains a part of our law.

However, it is often ignored by practitioners and rarely imposed by the courts of justice. If a document was intended to create a complete monument to a law law, extrinsic evidence cannot contradict, supplement or modify its importance (Johnson v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 943B). Second, interpretation is a question of law and not of fact, and therefore interpretation is a matter for the courts and not for witnesses (or, as common law jurisprudence says, not for a jury question: Hodge M Malek (ed) Phipson on Evidence (16 ED 2005) paragraph 33-64). Third, the rules on the admissibility of evidence do not depend on the nature of the document, whether it is the status, contract or patent (Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v Kimberly-Clark Corp [1985] ZASCZ 132 (at www.saflii.org.za), 1985 Burrell Patent Cases 126 (A)). Fourth, to the extent that evidence may be admissible to contextualize the document (since « context is everything » to determine its factual matrix, its purpose or for identification purposes, « it must be used as conservatively as possible » (Delmas Milling Co Ltd v du Plessis 1955 (3) SA 447 (A) at 455B-C). It is time for us to accept that there is no value in distinguishing between « substantive circumstances » and « environments ». The distinction is artificial and, in addition, the two terms are vague and confusing. Therefore, everything tends to be admitted. The terms « context » or « factual matrix » should suffice.

(See Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 (6) SA 453 (SCA) paragraphs 22 and 23 and Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Murray & Roberts (Pty) Ltd [2008] ZASCA 94; 2008 (6) SA 654 (SCA) paragraph 7. I agree and I would only add my approval that Lord Wright`s saying – because it is no longer the case – is. . What Lord Denning MR referred to is an attractive theory, but I think it`s a bad law. [8] [41] She also wrote to Hoeben on the same day that there had been « delays in concluding our agreement. »